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Abstract 
 
In this paper a method for analysing the fairness of an income tax system when portioning the population 
into heterogeneous socio-economic groups is proposed. The equitable tax system is defined by the three 
axioms given by Kakwani and Lambert (1998) and, as they suggest, inequity is evaluated by the negative 
influences on the redistributive effect of the tax associated with axiom violations. Measuring the extent of 
axiom violations among households belonging to different groups, we improve the Kakwani and Lambert 
analysis, which is able to detect only the existence of overall inequities. We propose a method that allows 
for evaluation of the contribution of each group to the overall inequity. Moreover, the adopted method 
enables disentangling the directions of violations. The obtained results allow us to judge how axiom 
violations discriminate among groups in their reciprocal relationships. An application to the 2010 Italian 
income tax reveals that inequities disproportionately penalize the household typologies. More precisely, 
unfairness affects households with children more severely than the other household groups. 
 
JEL Codes: C81, H23, H24 
Keywords: Micro-simulation Models, Personal Income Tax, Progressive Principle, 
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1. Introduction1 
As Lambert (2004, p. 39) notes, income tax is particularly subject to criteria of equity, 
being the unique tax instrument through which the government directly approaches its 
citizens. Horizontal and vertical equity are two of the basic commands of social justice 
that have been applied to income tax, raising a number of issues (Aronson, Johnson and 
Lambert, 1994; Aronson and Lambert, 1994; Aronson, Lambert and Trippeer, 1999; 
Wagstaff et al., 1999; van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert, 2001; Hyun and Lim, 2005; 
Urban and Lambert, 2008, among others). 
However, although the existing literature is very wide, it is not easy to check to what 
extent a tax system is fair. One example of this difficulty may be, for instance, the 
academic debate on the significance of horizontal equity itself. It is known that Kaplow 
(1989) and Kaplow and Shavell (2002) express reservations about its relevance, while 
Auerbach and Hassett (2002) and Dardanoni and Lambert (2001), among others, see the 
horizontal (in)equity notion as continuing to hold a firm grip on the assessment of fair 
tax policies. 
In the above-cited papers, however, the individuals have to be identical in every respect 
but, possibly, income. Things become much more complicated if we assume that the 
economic units may also differ with respect to further attributes: for instance, in the case 
of households we can have differences in size or needs. In this paper, we consider a 
non-homogeneous population. Dealing with a population partitioned by groups, we try 
to evaluate to what extent a tax system violates equity principles through ‘preferential’ 
treatment of certain groups of income units in comparison to some other groups. To 
pursue this aim, we start by the axiomatic definition of an equitable tax system provided 
by Kakwani and Lambert (1998) (hereafter KL). This choice allows us to avoid the 
question of measuring explicitly horizontal inequity. In their article, KL define equity in 
the income tax system by means of three axioms designed in such a way as to be 
independent. The three negative influences associated with axiom violations provide a 
mean to assess the extent of the inequity. The authors perform an overall analysis on a 
population of income units made homogeneous by applying a proper equivalence scale. 
                                                 
1 We wish to thank Paolo Liberati and Dino Rizzi as well as two anonymous Referees of this journal for their helpful comments. 
Usual disclaimers apply. 
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The extent of each type of inequity is measured by particular re-ranking indices, which 
are obtained starting from Lorenz curves. 
In contrast, we suppose a population partitioned into groups and define the Gini and 
concentration coefficients by differences between attributes related to pairs of income 
units. The values of the two coefficients are obtained by particular indicator functions. 
These definitions of the two coefficients lead to splitting the extents of the three 
inequity types into their within- and across-group components, both the components 
being re-ranking measures. As a consequence, the three across-group components are 
defined considering the contributions of group pairs to the overall across-group 
violations. We show that the proposed method allows for evaluation of the contribution 
of each single group to the overall inequity, and, what is more important, it allows 
judgement of how axiom violations discriminate among groups in their reciprocal 
relationships. 
More specifically, the groups can be ordered by their own level of penalization; the 
direction of group penalization deriving from axiom violations, either when pairs of 
groups are considered or when a single group is compared with all the others, can then 
be detected. 
No particular further effort is required to decompose the redistributive effect of taxes 
when the same method presented for the re-ranking indices is applied. This permits the 
obtaining of some other results. We can assess more precisely whether axiom violations 
undermine unfairness largely either within groups or across groups. Moreover, by 
means of the decomposition of the redistributive effect, it is possible to verify how a tax 
system distributes its possible inefficiencies through different groups of income units. 
The results are applied to the Italian Personal Income Tax. We recall that the income 
unit of the Italian Personal Income Tax is the individual. In terms of the present tax law, 
family charges are taken into account by using two sets of tax credits: a) tax credits for 
items of expenditure related to children, such as tuition fees; b) tax credits for working 
status and dependent relatives (children and spouse, as well as other individuals), which 
decrease with respect to the taxpayer’s gross income and become zero above a specific 
threshold. 
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We investigate the fairness of the Italian tax system with respect to households with 
different characteristics, using, as input data, those provided by the Bank of Italy (2012) 
in its Survey on Household Income and Wealth in the 2010 fiscal year. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model 
proposed by KL. Section 3 presents the within- and across-group decompositions of the 
inequity associated with axiom violations. In the same section, the measure of the 
contribution of each group to the overall level of inequity is presented. In Section 4, we 
recall the microsimulation model employed for the empirical analysis and present the 
empirical strategy; then the analytical instruments, which are introduced in Section 3, 
are applied to the Italian Personal Income Tax. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The Basic Model 
KL (p. 370) state that a tax system should respect the following three axioms in order to 
be equitable: tax should increase monotonically with respect to people’s ability to pay 
(Axiom 1); richer people should pay taxes at higher rates (Axiom 2); no re-ranking 
should occur in people’s living standards (Axiom 3). The three axioms can be formally 
expressed as follows: let X, Y, T and A be the pre- and post-tax income distribution, the 
tax liability distribution and the average tax rate distribution, respectively. For each pair 
of income units ({i,j}, i,j= 1, 2, …, H) it must hold: 
Axiom 1: i j i jx x t t   ; this is a requirement of minimal progression. KL (p. 370) 
observe that “because the inequalities are weak, horizontal equity is part of this Axiom”. 
Axiom 2: i j i j i jx x and t t a a    ; this is the content of the progressive principle. 
Axiom 3: i j i j i i j j i jx x and t t and t x t x y y     ; this is a vertical restriction 
ruling out too much progressivity. 
A violation of Axiom 1 automatically entails a violation of Axiom 2, although not 
necessarily the other way round. Moreover, Axiom 3 can be violated only if Axiom 2 
(and consequently Axiom 1) holds. 
The violations of the three axioms are detected by determining whether the ordering of 
the distribution of T, A and Y are the same as that of X. Thus, the following three re-
ranking indexes are suggested (KL, p. 373): 
  
 
5
| | |) ; ) ( ); ) .T T T X A A A X Y Y Y Xi R G C ii R G C iii R G C         (1) 
where XG , TG , AG  and YG  denote the Gini coefficient for pre-tax incomes, tax 
liabilities, average tax rates and post-tax incomes, respectively; CT|X, CA|X  and CY|X 
denote the corresponding concentration coefficients when T, A and Y are ordered by pre-
tax income.2 Consequently, the axiom violations are identified by RT>0 for Axiom 1, by 
RA>0 for Axiom 2 and by RY>0 for Axiom 3. The departure from equity of the income 
tax system is evaluated starting from a particular decomposition of the redistributive 
effect X YRE G G  , which, according to Kakwani (1984, p. 165), may be written as 
YRE P R  ,         (2) 
where: |T X XP C G   is the Kakwani progressivity index and τ is the ratio between the 
total amount of the tax and the total amount of the post-tax income. Then equation (2) is 
decomposed as:  
  1 2 3ARE P R S S S     .       (3) 
In Equation (3),  AP R   may be thought as a measure of the implicit or potential 
equity, while 
1 |T XS R ,  2 A TS R R   and 3 YS R       (4) 
provide an easy check on axioms 1-3. Their amounts indicate the extent of the 
departures from equity evaluated as losses of redistributive effect.3 
3. Within and Across-group Decompositions of the Redistributive Losses 
Consider a population of income units which can be gathered into L groups, Hd being 
the number of units in group d (d=1, 2,…., L). A weight pd,i (d =1, 2,…., Hd) is 
associated with each income unit with ,1
dH
d i di p N   and 1L dd N N  .4 The weight 
system depends on the scale coefficient associated with each unit, and when dealing 
with a sample, it also depends on the sample representativeness of the unit. Let Z be a 
                                                 
2 KL performe their analysis defining Gini and concentration coefficients by Lorenz curves. In particular, they defined the 
concentration curve LZ|X as the Lorenz curve for an attribute Z of income units, when these are ordered by the attribute X. 
3 In order to exactly apply the KL Axiom 2 statement, Pellegrino and Vernizzi (2012) propose a different approach for its 
measurement. However, in this paper the absolute extent of Axiom 2 violations does not strictly matter; as a consequence, we chose 
to employ the method originally suggested by KL. 
4 If we associate pd,i=1 to each income unit, Nd and N denote the number of income units in group d and in the overall population, 
respectively. 
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generic attribute characterizing the income units, we denote by ,d iz  and Z  the level of 
the attribute of Z associated with the unit i belonging to the group d and the overall 
average in the population. We compute the Gini coefficient by the Gini’s Mean 
Difference approach. In so doing, the overall Gini coefficient can be defined as a 
function of the differences between attribute levels and of the indicator function Zi jI  : 
 , , , ,2
1 1 1 1
1
2
d mH HL L Z
Z d i m j d i m j i j
d m i jZ
G z z p p I
N        , 
, ,
, ,
1:
1:
d i m jZ
i j
d i m j
z z
I
z z
  
. (5) 
Analogously, the concentration coefficient |Z XC  for the same attribute Z is defined as in 
(6), when the income units are lined up by non-decreasing order of another attribute X: 
  || , , , ,2
1 1 1 1
1
2
d mH HL L Z X
Z X d i m j d i m j i j
d m i jZ
C z z p p I
N        , 
, ,
|
, ,
, ,
1:
1:
:
d i m j
Z X
i j d i m j
Z
i j d i m j
x x
I x x
I x x


    
. (6) 
From expressions (5) and (6), it derives that the re-ranking index for Z with respect to X, 
|Z Z Z XR G C  , is given by: 
,
1 1
L L
d m
Z Z
d m
R R
 
   ,         (7) 
with 
   , |, , , ,2
1 1
1
2
d mH Hd m Z Z X
Z d i m j d i m j i j i j
i jZ
R z z p p I I
N      .    (8) 
From expressions (8), it follows that ,d dZR defines the contribution of group d to the 
overall within group re-ranking. This contribution is a function of the re-ranking within 
the group d and of strictly positive weighting functions representing the share of income 
units and the share of post-tax income attributed to group d. The contribution of the 
group pair d, m to the overall across group re-ranking, is represented by  , ,d m m dZ ZR R  
and it will be denoted by d m m dZ ZR R
  . d mZR  is a function of the re-ranking between 
individuals of group d, compared with individuals of group m (or vice-versa) and of the 
two functions, which represent the shares related to the two groups. 
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It can be shown that the re-ranking ZR  decomposes into two re-ranking measures:5 the 
measure of re-ranking within each group, WZR , and the measure of re-ranking across 
groups, AGZR , which evaluates the re-ranking among units belonging to different groups. 
Then, from the above given definitions, we write6 
,
1
L
W d d
Z Z
d
R R

   and 
1 1
L L
AG d m
Z Z
d m d
R R 
  
   .      (9) 
Decompositions (9) can be applied to decompose the losses of redistributive effects 
defined in (4) into their within- and across-group components. Denoting by 1
WS , 2
WS  
and 3
WS , and by 1
AGS , 2
AGS  and 3
AGS  the within- and the across-group components of 
S1, S2, and S3, one writes: 
1 1 1
W AGS S S  , 1W WTS R  and 1AG AGTS R ; 
2 2 2
W AGS S S  ,  2W W WA TS R R   and  2AG AG AGA TS R R  ;   (10) 
3 3 3
W AGS S S   where 3W WYS R  and 3AG AGYS R . 
The contributions of group d (d=1, 2, …, L) to the overall within effect are given by 
,
1
d d d
TS R ,  , ,2d d d d dA TS R R  , ,3d d dYS R      (11) 
and the ratios  %ds sS S  (s=1,2,3) are their normalized measures. 
Considering the overall across group effect, expression (9) allows to define the joint 
contributions of groups d and m (d, m=1, 2,…, L; d≠m) as in (12) 
1
md m d
TS R  ,  2d m d m d mA TS R R     , 3d m d mYS R  ,    (12) 
It is clear from (12) that the problem of evaluating the contribution of a single group to 
overall across group effect arises. We will show that the ratio  / 2 %ds sS S  is a 
normalized measure of the contribution of the single group d to the loss of redistributive 
effect due to the axiom s (s=1,2,3) violation. The term dsS
  represents the overall 
axiom s violations, which involve group d with all the other L−1 groups. 
Let us considered the structure of re-ranking between two groups. 
                                                 
5 See Monti, Mussini and Vernizzi (2010) on the issue of re-ranking decomposition. 
6 Expressions in (9) are strictly linked with the Dagum (1997) decomposition of the Gini coefficient as discussed in Monti (2008). It 
is worth noting that an analogous decomposition has been recently formalized by Ebert (2010). 
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Re-rankings across two groups, d and m, can be observed in two different situations: i) 
, ,d i m jx x  and , ,d i m jz z ; ii) , ,d i m jx x  and , ,d i m jz z . In i) the rank of the income unit i 
belonging to group d is lower than that of j belonging to m in X distribution, and it is 
greater in Z distribution; in ii) the situation is reversed: the rank of the income unit i, 
belonging to group d, is greater than that of j, belonging to m in X distribution and it is 
lower in Z distribution. Obviously, the re-ranking impact on the two income units is 
different in the two cases. In i), the income unit of d goes beyond the unit of m in the 
ranking of Z, when this ranking is compared with the ranking of X; we denote changes 
like this by d→m, the direction of the arrow indicating the direction of the overtaking. 
In ii) the income unit of m overtakes income unit of d; we denote these changes by 
m→d. The (unfair) shifts of dm favour d if Z is a desirable attribute (income), whilst 
they are against d and in favour of m if Z is an unpleasant attribute (tax or tax rate). The 
last remark has to be reversed in case ii). Formally, in equation (8) one has:7 
- case i):  | 2Z Z Xi j i jI I   , we denote by d mZR   the weighted sum of the differences 
that in (8) are positive and then associated with 2. 
- case ii):  | 2Z Z Xi j i jI I    , we denote by m dZR   the weighed sum of the differences 
that in (8) are negative and then associated with -2. 
The contribution d mZR
  of the two groups d and m to the across-group re-ranking AGZR  
is then decomposed as: 
d m d m m d
Z Z ZR R R
    .        (13) 
The overall across group re-ranking, AGZR , rewrites as 
1 1
L L
AG d d
Z Z Z
d d
R R R 
 
           (14) 
where 1,
Ld d m
Z Zm d mR R
 
    represents the contribution to overall re-ranking 
depending on overtaking of income units of group d on income units belonging to each 
other group, and 1,
Ld m d
Z Zm d mR R
 
   represents the contribution to overall re-
ranking given by overtaking of all other groups on group d. 
                                                 
7 If both in the Z and X distribution the rank of i is greater (lower) than the rank of j, no re-ranking occurs and 
 
 | 0Z Z Xi j i jI I   . 
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Applying these results, we are able to write the contributions to the losses of the 
redistributive effect due to overtaking of group d on group m as: 
1
d m d m
TS R  ;  2d m d m d mA TS R R    ; 3d m d mYS R  .   (15) 
The contributions to the losses of the redistributive effect due to overtaking of group d 
on all the other groups, and the contribution due to overtaking of each other group on 
group d , are given by 
1,
L
d d m
s s
m m d
S S 
 
  , 
1,
L
d m d
s s
m m d
S S 
 
  ,  s=1, 2, 3.  (16) 
The overall loss of redistributive effect that involve the single group d when this group 
is compared with all the other L−1 groups is then 
d d d
s s sS S S
    ,  s=1, 2, 3.      (17) 
It is easy to see that 1 1
L Ld d
s sd dS S
 
   , and that both the sums are equal to AGsS , 
so that 1 2
L d AG
s sd S S

  . This leads to suggest the ratio  / 2 %ds sS S  as a measure 
of the contribution of group d to the loss of redistributive effect due to axiom s 
violation. 
Analogous decompositions apply to the redistributive effect of taxes. Two measures can 
be defined: the measure of the contribution to the overall actual redistributive effect due 
to tax effects within group d, REd, and the contribution due to tax effects between 
groups d and m, d mRE  .8 The ratios between losses of redistributive effect and the 
correspondent redistributive effects allows detection of whether axiom violations 
undermine unfairness to a greater extent, either within groups or across groups, and to 
verify how a tax system distributes its possible inefficiencies through different groups of 
income units. 
We conclude this section by observing that the Gini’s Mean Difference approach 
permits a definition of the Gini coefficient and of all its components as a weighted sum 
of differences. In our case, this possibility builds a bridge between the measures we 
propose and some measures suggested by Duclos (2000) in order to evaluate the extent 
of some individual perceptions as relative deprivation, ill-fortune and resentment.9 For 
                                                 
8 Details on RE decompositions are available on request. 
9 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. 
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instance, Duclos (2000, p.142) measures individual fiscal ill fortune as “the sum of the 
incomes of those individuals by whom they are overtaken minus the sum of the incomes 
of those they succeed in outranking”. It is evident that, given this definition, and writing 
re-ranking as in (7) with Z=Y, no further efforts are required to define re-ranking as a 
weighted average of fiscal ill fortune in the population. The links between the results 
presented here and some measures derived from the deprivation literature (more or less 
directly) could be object of further researches. 
4. Data, Empirical Strategy and Results 
4.1 Data and Empirical Strategy 
In order to apply our results we use as input data those provided by the Bank of Italy in 
its Survey on Household Income and Wealth (hereafter SHIW) published in 2012. This 
contains information on household post-tax income and wealth in the year 2010, 
covering 7,951 households, and 19,836 individuals. The sample is representative of the 
Italian population, which is composed of about 24 million households and 60 million 
individuals. As the SHIW provides only information on each individual’s PIT net 
income, we estimate the PIT gross income for each taxpayer. The model we employ is 
an updated version of the model described in Pellegrino et al. (2011). Considering the 
income units, results concerning the gross income as well as tax liability distribution are 
very close to the Ministry of Economics and Finance’s official statistics (2011). 
Given that our theoretical results focus on a non-homogeneous population, we split 
Italian households into seven groups, according to their composition: 1) singles (24.9% 
of total households); 2) couples without children (23.3%); 3) couples with one child 
(16.1%); 4) couples with two children (16.9%); 5) couples with three or more children 
(4.9%); 6) parent alone with one or more children (6.9%); 7) all other household 
typologies (7.1%). Groups 3, 4, 5 and 6 are characterized by the presence of parents 
with children, groups 1 and 2 are characterized by the presence of sole adults and group 
7 is a residual group. The choice of these groups is coherent with both the kind of 
decomposition we are going to apply, and the structure of Italian personal income tax, 
which provides income-related tax credits for earned income and dependent individuals 
within the household. This partition allows for an evaluation of the extent to which the 
  
 
11
Italian tax system considers the decreasing of the tax capability that occurs when the 
same income has to be shared by a different number of persons. 
To perform the analysis, nominal incomes have to be transformed into equivalent 
incomes, and thus a proper equivalence scale has to be applied. The use of an 
equivalence scale is always necessary for across-group comparisons. In our case the 
scale is necessary also in the within-group analysis, because within each household 
typology the characteristics of the group units can be dissimilar. For instance, 
considering the typologies of family with children, children’s ages can be different and 
the number of income earners can be unequal. Even dealing with singles, the working 
status of the group units can be different. 
We choose to apply the equivalence scale ES adopted by KL (p. 376) and defined as 
  wcccaES 1.07.04.02.0 8.0321  ,      (18) 
where a is the number of adults within the households, 1c  is the number of children 
aged 5 years or less, 2c  is the number of children aged between 6 and 14 years, 3c  is the 
number of children aged between 15 and 17 years, w is the number of employees or 
self-employed within the households, and 0.8 is the parameter that indicates the 
economies of scale attached to the equivalence scale. 
This scale presents some advantages: it takes into account the age differences of the 
children, the number of parents, and the number of income earners. ES introduces also 
economies of scale.10 Nevertheless, we remark that whatever the scale may be, its 
application can only partially mitigate within-group heterogeneity and make across-
group incomes equivalent for comparison. 
As observed by Ebert and Moyes (2000, p. 131-132), there are different strategies for 
the application of the equivalence scale. In the empirical analysis discussed in Section 
4.2, we weigh the equivalent household incomes by the equivalence scale. However, our 
results are also confirmed when equivalent incomes are not weighed by the equivalence 
scale. 
 
 
                                                 
10 Results here presented have been compared with those obtained applying the OECD scale. The results obtained with the OCSE 
scale are coherent with those here reported for KL’s scale, even if with fewer remarked disproportions in violations. 
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4.2 Results 
The starting point of our analysis is the original KL overall decomposition of the 
redistributive effect. Results are presented in Table 1. Focusing on equivalent 
households,11 the Gini coefficient (×100) for the pre-tax equivalent household 
distribution is 38.88, whilst the Gini coefficient for the post-tax distribution is 33.70. 
The overall redistributive effect, RE, is then 5.18. The potential redistributive effect that 
could be obtained if all inequities could be abolished is equal to 5.98. Therefore, total 
inequities reduce the potential redistributive effect by 0.80. From Table 1, we can 
conclude that the total axiom violations are 15.42% of the actual redistributive effect. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The lowest loss is due to Axiom 3 violations: the re-ranking from pre- to post-tax 
income distribution causes a loss of potential redistributive effect which is just 1.55% of 
RE; the loss due to Axiom 2 violations is the greatest, being more than 10% of RE, 
whilst the weight of Axiom 1 violations is 3.6% of RE.12 From these results, we can say 
that the Italian tax system does not cause an excessive undue re-ranking in transition 
from pre- to post-tax income distribution. Axiom 2 violations are the greatest source of 
loss in the potential redistributive effect; nevertheless, some caution is needed in 
evaluating its amount, as pointed out in footnote 4. 
Then, considering each Axiom violation separately, our main goal is to describe the 
distribution of axiom violations either among or within household typologies as well as 
to assess the impact of axiom violations on each group. 
To pursue these objectives, we evaluate the contribution of each household typology to 
the overall axiom violations (Table 2). Then, using expressions (13)-(17), we improve 
our analysis by describing and interpreting the direction of axiom violations among 
household typologies (Tables 3, 4 and 5). Lastly, the intensity of violations is evaluated 
with respect to the actual redistribution performance (Table 6). 
Let us begin by analyzing the content of Table 2. The last three rows of this table allow 
for some preliminary comments. First, we observe that the within-group effect is 
                                                 
11 The average tax rate is 20.12%. The concentration coefficient for the net income distribution is 33.62, whilst that on the tax debt 
distribution is 59.75. Then the Kakwani index is 20.88, whilst the Reynolds-Smolensky index is 5.26. 
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smaller than the across-group effect; the share of the former is about 16% of the overall 
effect for each axiom, whilst the share of the latter is a bit less than 84%. This is not a 
surprising result; as Frosini (2012, pp. 182-183) observes, the greater the group number 
is, the lesser the relative contribution is of the ‘within’ component. Moreover, the same 
three rows of the table show that, although the measures of the overall axiom violations 
are different (see Table 1), the contributions of the within- and across-group effects to 
the overall violation amount to almost the same share whatever axiom we are 
considering. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Ordering the contributions of each group in decreasing order, one observes that the 
same ordering holds when considering both the contributions to the within-typology 
violations  %ds sS S  and the contributions to the across-group 
violations  2 %ds sS S . We can see that the group ‘couple with two children’ presents 
the highest values, followed by the group ‘couples without children’. Typologies 5, 6 
and 7 give the lowest contributions. However, interpreting the figures presented in 
Table 2 requires some caution. We cannot forget that these figures depend both on the 
average income and on the number of households related to each typology. When 
weighted by the equivalence scale, the number of households belonging to the typology 
‘couples with two children’ is the largest one, while that belonging to the typology 
‘parent alone with children’ is the smallest.13 Moreover, as underlined in Section 4.1, 
Groups 5, 6 and 7 are characterized by the highest degree of heterogeneity. We are 
conscious of these limits. However, on the one hand, to exclude typologies has a 
reductive effect on the analysis, and on the other hand, it is quite impossible to 
disentangle share amounts from re-ranking amounts, especially when evaluating the 
contribution of a group to the across-group axiom violations. 
To improve our investigation, we detect the direction of axiom violations by explicitly 
applying the results obtained in (15). Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the direction of the impact 
                                                                                                                                               
12 We observe that the same ranking of axiom violations is estimated by KL for the 1984 Australian income tax. 
  
 
14
of axiom violations when pairs of household typologies are considered and when a 
particular typology is compared with all the others. Shares do not play any role in the 
extent of the results presented in these tables. 
Table 3 takes into account violations concerning the lack of the requirement of minimal 
progression. Considering the contribution to Axiom 1 violations, we can see, for 
instance, that only 18.96% of tax liability re-rankings penalizes ‘singles’, whilst 74.89% 
penalizes couples ‘with two children’. The figures in the last column of Table 3 show 
that ‘singles’ and ‘couples without children’ are the least penalized typologies whilst 
‘couples with two’ and ‘three or more children’ are the most penalized. These results do 
not vary considering Axiom 2 and Axiom 3 violations (Table 4 and 5) violations: the 
typologies ‘couples with two’ and ‘three or more children’ are always the most 
penalized by re-rankings, with respect to all the remaining typologies. The behaviour of 
the impact of the axiom violations on the groups does not change if we consider the 
relations across households belonging to two different typologies: the ‘singles’ appear 
to be the least penalized and ‘couples with two’ and ‘three or more children’ are still the 
most penalized. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
This penalization registered for households with children depends on the present 
structure of the Italian PIT. Our analysis seems to point out that the system of tax credits 
for dependent relatives (children in particular) is not so generous as it should be in order 
to limit this unpleasant outcome. From this point of view, the increase of the tax credits 
values for children introduced by the 2013 tax law should be viewed as a tool that may 
reduce the discriminations pointed out in this analysis. 
It is interesting to note that the percentage of contribution to the overall axiom 
violations for ‘couples with three children’,  5 2 %s sS S , is not too high (see Table 2). 
                                                                                                                                               
13 If we rank household groups according to their weighed frequencies, we have: Group 4 (11 million), Group 2 (10 million), Group 
3 (9 million), Group 1 (6.2 million), Group 7 (4.4 million), Group 5 (3.7 million), and Group 6 (3.2 million). 
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This should suggest that corrections of unfairness involving households with three 
children might be performed with marginal efforts. 
We conclude our analysis by using the ratio between axiom violations and the 
correspondent redistributive effects to pursue two goals. Firstly, we would detect 
whether axiom violations undermine unfairness largely, either within groups or across 
groups. Then we would verify how a tax system distributes its possible inefficiencies 
through different groups of households. From Table 6, we can immediately observe that 
for each axiom, the differences between the across-group ratio  AG AGsS RE  and the 
within-group ratio  W WsS RE  are much lower than those existing between  AGs sS S  
and  Ws sS S . However, the across-group ratio for each axiom s (s=1, 2, 3) remains 
greater than the within-group ratio: all the three ratios  AG AGsS RE  are roughly 1.15 
times greater than the corresponding  W WsS RE . Consequently, when compared with 
the redistribution actually performed, overall across-group violations can be considered 
more severe than within-group ones. 
We observe that, for each axiom s=1, 2, 3, the ratios  %d m d msS RE   (Table 6) 
present the same ordering as the ratios  / %sS RE  (Table 1). A deeper insight into 
Table 6 allows to note that the group of ‘singles’ is the household typology which 
presents the lowest within values  1 1 %sS RE  for each s, whilst ‘parent alone with 
children’ (d=6) and ‘other typologies (d=7) show the greatest violations. Interpreting 
these results requires the same remarks as were introduced when analyzing the 
contribution of each household typology to the overall axiom violations (Table 2). They 
may depend partially on the high homogeneity of the ‘singles’ and on the relative lack 
of homogeneity characterizing the last two typologies. Among the typologies with 
children and both parents, the ‘couples with three children’ presents the highest ratio 
between axiom violations and redistributive effect. 
The ratio orderings do not change if we look at the overall relations of one typology 
with all the others; the highest ratios  d dsS RE   % are again registered by the group 
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‘parent alone with children’ and ‘other typologies’, whilst the lowest values are 
observed when considering ‘singles’ and ‘couples without children’. 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
5. Conclusion 
We have proposed an approach for analyzing the fairness of an income-tax system when 
population is partitioned into heterogeneous socio-economic groups. The extent of 
inequity is evaluated starting with the KL axiomatic definition of an equitable tax 
system. This gives three axioms for an income tax to be equitable. Axiom violations 
exert distinct negative influences on the redistributive effect of the tax and the authors 
measure these negative influences by three re-ranking indexes: the re-ranking index of 
taxes, tax rates and net incomes with respect to pre-tax incomes. KL’s analysis is 
limited to overall indicators. 
Our analysis improves the KL results by considering a non-homogeneous population 
and measuring the extent of axiom violations among units belonging to different groups. 
An overall analysis (according to the original KL approach) simply detects the existence 
of inequities. Our analysis evaluates the within- and across-group inequity and detects 
the direction of the group penalization deriving from axiom violations either when pairs 
of groups are considered or when a single group is compared with all the others. This 
allows us to calculate the contribution of each group to the overall inequity and to judge 
how axiom violations discriminate among groups in their reciprocal relations. 
Using the data provided by the Bank of Italy (2012) in its Survey on Household Income 
and Wealth in 2010, we apply our theoretical method to the personal income taxation of 
this country. We split households into groups characterized by different compositions 
and we evaluate the impact of departures from equity due to axiom violations within 
groups, across groups and in each group. In particular, for what concerns across-group 
violations, we evaluate the extent of the direction of violations. 
Even if overall across-group violations are only a little more severe than within-group 
ones, when related to the corresponding redistributive effect, using our method we 
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highlight a disproportion in the direction of across-group violations. By evaluating 
redistributive losses for each group, and for every pair of groups, our results show quite 
clearly that inequity is not proportionally distributed among the different groups of 
households. This lack of proportionality penalizes households with children, which 
appear to be particularly disadvantaged with respect to other household typologies. 
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Table 1: Overall RE decomposition for households (x 100) 
 Pre-tax income 
Post-tax 
income RE 
Potential 
equity 
Axiom 
1 
Axiom 
2 
Axiom 
3 
Total 
Axioms 
KL’s Decomposition 38.88 33.70  5.18    5.98 0.19   0.53 0.08 0.80 
  -  - 100.00 115.42 3.60 10.27 1.55 15.42 
Source: Our elaborations on SHIW 2012.        
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Table 2: Decomposition of the loss of redistributive effect due to axiom violations 
(% of correspondent overall Ss, s=1, 2,3) 
 1 1 %dS S  
 2 2 %dS S  
 3 3 %dS S  
1.10 4.76 3.67 5.07 0.45 0.39 0.67 
1.14 4.08 3.62 5.50 0.54 0.52 0.73 
0.95 4.76 3.93 5.10 0.41 0.38 0.64 
 1 12 %dS S  
 2 22 %dS S  
 3 32 %dS S  
11.29 18.06 15.77 18.90 6.28 5.88 7.72 
11.24 16.70 15.50 19.23 6.77 6.52 7.78 
10.99 17.92 16.11 19.15 6.48 5.67 7.54 
 1 1 %WS S =16.12 
 2 2 %WS S =16.12 
 3 3 %WS S =16.16 
 1 1 %AGS S  83.88 
 2 2 %AGS S  83.88 
 3 3 %AGS S  83.84 
Source: Our elaborations on SHIW 2012. 
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Table 3: Axiom 1 - Comparisons of losses between group pairs and between one group and all the others 
(% of the two contrasting directions) 
1
1
%
d m
d m
S
S 

 m=1 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 1
1
%
d
d
S
S 

  
d=1 - 34.82 14.34 10.83 9.70 24.35 27.40 18.96 
d=2 65.18 - 25.23 17.69 15.76 34.76 42.30 29.55 
d=3 85.66 74.77 - 38.46 34.55 60.75 68.80 61.95 
d=4 89.17 82.31 61.54 - 47.46 70.78 77.38 74.89 
d=5 90.30 84.24 65.45 52.54 - 71.47 75.66 73.26 
d=6 75.65 65.24 39.25 29.22 28.53 - 56.80 48.33 
d=7 72.60 57.70 31.20 22.63 24.34 43.20 - 40.23 
1
1
%
m
m
S
S 

  81.04 70.45 38.05 25.11 26.74 51.67 59.77  
Source: Our elaborations on SHIW 2012. 
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Table 4: Axiom 2 - Comparisons of losses between group pairs and between one group and all the others 
(% of the two contrasting directions) 
2
2
%
d m
d m
S
S 

 m=1 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 2
2
%
d
d
S
S 

  
d=1 - 40.51 20.79 17.75 22.69 28.85 35.32 25.79 
d=2 59.49 - 25.65 19.26 18.59 31.78 41.89 29.42 
d=3 79.21 74.35 - 40.73 41.39 55.14 67.32 60.45 
d=4 82.25 80.74 59.27 - 52.31 62.22 73.65 71.14 
d=5 77.31 81.41 58.61 47.69 - 54.97 67.48 64.90 
d=6 71.15 68.22 44.86 37.78 45.03 - 60.15 53.01 
d=7 64.68 58.11 32.68 26.35 32.52 39.85 - 40.80 
2
2
%
m
m
S
S 

  74.21 70.58 39.55 28.86 35.10 46.99 59.20  
Source: Our elaborations on SHIW, 2012. 
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Table 5: Axiom 3 - Comparisons of losses between group pairs and between one group and all the others 
(% of the two contrasting directions) 
3
3
%
d m
d m
S
S 

 m=1 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 3
3
%
d
d
S
S 

  
d=1 - 67.31 85.83 91.30 93.40 79.66 75.68 83.31 
d=2 32.69 - 74.31 83.14 85.52 63.87 57.14 70.62 
d=3 14.17 25.69 - 59.08 68.67 37.53 28.57 37.96 
d=4 8.70 16.86 40.92 - 58.21 29.40 21.91 25.62 
d=5 6.60 14.48 31.33 41.79 - 23.29 22.17 23.67 
d=6 20.34 36.13 62.47 70.60 76.71 - 41.67 52.19 
d=7 24.32 42.86 71.43 78.09 77.83 58.33 - 61.07 
3
3
%
m
m
S
S 

  16.69 29.38 62.04 74.38 76.33 47.81 38.93  
Source: Our elaborations on SHIW, 2012. 
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Table 6: Decomposition of the loss of redistributive effect due to axiom violations 
(% of corresponding RE) 
On the diagonal:  %d dsS RE ;  outside the diagonal:  %d m d msS RE   
 
m=1 m=2 m=3 m=4 m=5 m=6 m=7 
d=1 
2.04 
5.99 
0.76 
2.56 
6.69 
1.04 
3.62 
9.96 
1.54 
4.00 
11.48 
1.72 
4.04 
12.33 
1.81 
3.79 
12.20 
1.44 
3.25 
9.90 
1.27 
d=2  
2.95 
7.21 
1.27 
3.69 
9.49 
1.59 
3.92 
10.39 
1.70 
3.75 
9.91 
1.63 
3.72 
10.70 
1.62 
3.49 
9.26 
1.46 
d=3   
3.58 
10.07 
1.65 
3.45 
10.16 
1.58 
3.12 
9.47 
1.48 
4.13 
12.64 
1.76 
4.20 
11.99 
1.81 
d=4    
3.30 
10.21 
1.43 
2.90 
10.07 
1.29 
4.39 
14.14 
1.78 
4.52 
13.62 
1.93 
d=5     
3.74 
12.93 
1.46 
4.81 
17.74 
2.02 
5.14 
15.93 
2.20 
d=6      
5.49 
20.62 
2.27 
5.41 
18.05 
2.21 
d=7       
4.98 
15.43 
2.05 
 1 %d dS RE    
 2 %d dS RE    
 3 %d dS RE    
3.43 3.54 3.64 3.81 3.59 4.17 4.07 
9.75 9.35 10.21 11.07 11.04 13.18 11.93 
1.44 1.51 1.60 1.66 1.59 1.73 1.71 
 1 %W WS RE =3.20 
 2 %W WS RE =9.12 
 3 %W WS RE =1.38 
 1 %AG AGS RE  3.69 
 2 %AG AGS RE  10.53 
 3 %AG AGS RE  1.59 
Source: Our elaborations on SHIW, 2012. 
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